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So other pilots feel as you do?I’ve been a Boeing pilot for over 20 years.....I’m not getting on a 737 max until they fix the problem
Thanks. One always learns something new on this board.Most that I know......the big concern for me is that the system(s) involved in the LionAir crash are individually good. Working together, on the 737max, they are problematic. The early data from the Ethiopian crash suggests similar issues. While it’s way too early to guess at the causes and contributing factors, I know enough to avoid the airframe.
Working together, on the 737max, they are problematic
You’re more likely to die eating organic produce
EU grounded the 737 MAX today. Lots of pressure on Boeing. Being a US company, I root for Boeing over Airbus. I hope these crashes weren't Boeing's fault. (having said that, i prefer to fly in Airbus products as, to me, the seats are more comfortable and they feel like they are quieter. Best flight I ever had was in a airbus A380 second floor.
---There are two things about the MAX automated system (MCAS) that are troubling and out of character for Boeing. 1) System takes control from the pilot and it's a complex, multi-stage process for the pilot to get control back. That is counter to Boeing's longtime stated philosophy that the pilot always has control and the automated system is an assistant.
2) The MCAS system can apparently be fooled by bad data from a single angle of attack sensor. That goes against the longtime design philosophy of redundancy -- no single component failure should be enough to bring down a plane.
All this was known before the Ethiopian crash so it's really tragic that Boeing and the FAA couldn't get an effective fix deployed before they lost a second aircraft. We don't know for sure whether MCAS was involved in the Ethopian crash but it looks extremely similar to the Lionair crash.
The big question for me is, why did Boeing go against its longtime design philosophy when it designed MCAS to be so hard for the pilot to override? Part of it may simply have been inadequate design/testing -- they didn't adequately deal with the bad sensor scenario.
But still, why did they design it so the system would take control from the pilot? That's so unlike Boeing, and Boeing pilots have been shocked when they found that out.
Two possible scenarios:
1) Boeing engineers were concerned about the inherent stability of the plane, especially early in flight. There are reports that flight testing found an unusual and dangerous stall condition (because of the forward position of the MAX engines) that Boeing hadn't anticipated. Maybe they did MCAS because they were afraid pilots wouldn't be able to recognize or react to the stall fast enough to save the aircraft.
Or 2) The FAA was so concerned about the stall scenario that they insisted Boeing do MCAS or they wouldn't certify the plane.
The nightmare scenario for Boeing (unlikely in my opinion, but a possibility) is that the physical design of the Max is so inherently unstable during takeoff that it isn't really safe to fly without MCAS. So if they can't revise MCAS and satisfy the safety agencies (not just the FAA, but now they have to worry about Europe and China), they could be forced to physically redesign the plane, which would mean delaying deliveries (and we're talking around 500 aircraft a year).for at least 2 years. That would be catastrophic for Boeing and have a big impact on the whole industry.
Ironically, Boeing in 2011 had wanted to do a clean-sheet 737 redesign, but then Airbus announced the A320neo re-engining and Boeing had to respond quickly or lose market share -- the Max was the result. In order to speed the timeline Boeing kept the same 737 fuselage and wing position, so the only way they could fit the engines was to mount them extra-far forward, which changes the flight characteristics.
totally agree but eyewitnesses are often the least accurate. The black box will tell the tale. (assuming the press reports it accurately)---
The only thing that bothers me is that witnesses on the ground said it was smoking, making strange noises, and had debris falling off as it came done. That doesn't sound like a control problem to me.
As a previous poster said, it is up to the carrier. The seats are their thing. On United, it is clear the airbus product seats recline more....at least that is my experience.I've flown on Frontier a few times over the last 3 three years and it was my first time on Airbus planes (A320). I found the seats to be too firm and upright and you can't adjust the seat back if you are behind row 5.
Are you serious? I have never heard of such a thing. Please elaborate.
I misspoke with organic specifically but 3000 Americans die every year from foodborn illness. 5 died from tainted lettuce last year which I had read was organic but turns out wasn’t. Point still stands. Eating lettuce killed more people in the us last year than us commercial air travel even with the deathtrap 737 max flying unrestrained.
Okay, now I'm on board. There are so many things people do without thinking every single day that are more likely to kill them than flying on this particular plane. That said, why fly on that plane if there are other planes that aren't having any known problems?
I think the nightmare scenario is that it becomes public knowledge that Boeing bribed officials to certify the plane.There are two things about the MAX automated system (MCAS) that are troubling and out of character for Boeing. 1) System takes control from the pilot and it's a complex, multi-stage process for the pilot to get control back. That is counter to Boeing's longtime stated philosophy that the pilot always has control and the automated system is an assistant.
2) The MCAS system can apparently be fooled by bad data from a single angle of attack sensor. That goes against the longtime design philosophy of redundancy -- no single component failure should be enough to bring down a plane.
All this was known before the Ethiopian crash so it's really tragic that Boeing and the FAA couldn't get an effective fix deployed before they lost a second aircraft. We don't know for sure whether MCAS was involved in the Ethopian crash but it looks extremely similar to the Lionair crash.
The big question for me is, why did Boeing go against its longtime design philosophy when it designed MCAS to be so hard for the pilot to override? Part of it may simply have been inadequate design/testing -- they didn't adequately deal with the bad sensor scenario.
But still, why did they design it so the system would take control from the pilot? That's so unlike Boeing, and Boeing pilots have been shocked when they found that out.
Two possible scenarios:
1) Boeing engineers were concerned about the inherent stability of the plane, especially early in flight. There are reports that flight testing found an unusual and dangerous stall condition (because of the forward position of the MAX engines) that Boeing hadn't anticipated. Maybe they did MCAS because they were afraid pilots wouldn't be able to recognize or react to the stall fast enough to save the aircraft.
Or 2) The FAA was so concerned about the stall scenario that they insisted Boeing do MCAS or they wouldn't certify the plane.
The nightmare scenario for Boeing (unlikely in my opinion, but a possibility) is that the physical design of the Max is so inherently unstable during takeoff that it isn't really safe to fly without MCAS. So if they can't revise MCAS and satisfy the safety agencies (not just the FAA, but now they have to worry about Europe and China), they could be forced to physically redesign the plane, which would mean delaying deliveries (and we're talking around 500 aircraft a year).for at least 2 years. That would be catastrophic for Boeing and have a big impact on the whole industry.
Ironically, Boeing in 2011 had wanted to do a clean-sheet 737 redesign, but then Airbus announced the A320neo re-engining and Boeing had to respond quickly or lose market share -- the Max was the result. In order to speed the timeline Boeing kept the same 737 fuselage and wing position, so the only way they could fit the engines was to mount them extra-far forward, which changes the flight characteristics.
I think the nightmare scenario is that it becomes public knowledge that Boeing bribed officials to certify the plane.
Note this is speculation. But I wouldn’t be shocked.
because it's his job, I imagine-Why is a Bank of America analyst projecting how long it'll take to install software updates?
Interesting that the plane was approximately twice the normal takeoff speed. The Max has over sized engines on it, so maybe the crew over powered them in the roll out. That would indicate an inexperienced (for this plane) crew.Interesting article with some info on what happened during the flight at THIS LINK
Flew on the MAX on SWA Monday from PIT to HOU. Brand new and a great plane. Then the FAA stepped in and grounded them when, Wednesday? Back from Hobby today on a 737-700.
I wanted to buttonhole a Captain or FO and ask what they thought but didn't get the opportunity.
For the pilots out there - let's say you're type rated on a 737-700. Does that count for the -800 or the MAX? Or is there a separate type rating?
The B737 type rating applies to all variants of the 737. This includes the 737-200 (which had sreaight jets), the 737-3/4/500, the 737 next generation 7/8/900 which have turbofans and the 737 max family which have different engines and a longer nose gear. The MCAS system was installed to mitigate some of the issues caused by the new engines’ size, power and location. The system is not functional during operations with the autopilot engaged or when the flaps are deployed.Flew on the MAX on SWA Monday from PIT to HOU. Brand new and a great plane. Then the FAA stepped in and grounded them when, Wednesday? Back from Hobby today on a 737-700.
I wanted to buttonhole a Captain or FO and ask what they thought but didn't get the opportunity.
For the pilots out there - let's say you're type rated on a 737-700. Does that count for the -800 or the MAX? Or is there a separate type rating?
Thanks for the info! Appreciate it!The B737 type rating applies to all variants of the 737. This includes the 737-200 (which had sreaight jets), the 737-3/4/500, the 737 next generation 7/8/900 which have turbofans and the 737 max family which have different engines and a longer nose gear. The MCAS system was installed to mitigate some of the issues caused by the new engines’ size, power and location. The system is not functional during operations with the autopilot engaged or when the flaps are deployed.
That’s correct. It’s also exactly the reason that Boeing has not scratched the 737 program in favor of a replacement airframe.....Someone wants to maintain fleet commonality.Thanks for the info! Appreciate it!
So on an airline like SWA which flies ONLY 737's, then any pilot - any plane - any route - any time?
That may very well be what Boeing would suggest. I tend to think that poor design coupled with withholding systems information from the flight crews is what led to the accident.""They didn't seem to know the trim was moving down," the third source said. "They thought only about airspeed and altitude. That was the only thing they talked about.""
So poor maintenance of the plane led to MCAS kicking in when it shouldn't have, and poor piloting cause the pilots to not recover correctly
Stop....Look at the planes data hard to imagine it was terrorism. There were vertical speed issues before the crash which does sound like the same issue the last 737 max 8 had.