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OT: Muilenburg finally fired by Boeing.

You would think succeeding versions of the 737 would be increasingly safe, given the extended amount of time there has been to refine and perfect this plane.
It appears that increasing complexity and zillions of additional lines of code are no guarantee.
 
What I don’t understand is why they can’t just disable MCAS and certify the airplane without it.

The 737 has flown for fifty years without that kind of automation so it’s clearly not required for flight, to me anyway.
 
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What I don’t understand is why they can’t just disable MCAS and certify the airplane without it.

The 737 has flown for fifty years without that kind of automation so it’s clearly not required for flight, to me anyway.

Because they put oversized engines on the plane to get the fuel efficiency. Oversized in terms of height.

Then because the ground clearance on this plane is low for terminals they had to move the engines forward. They are way ahead of the wing.

Because the engines are forward, under high acceleration the nose goes up which will cause a stall.

Ldn
 
Because they put oversized engines on the plane to get the fuel efficiency. Oversized in terms of height.

Then because the ground clearance on this plane is low for terminals they had to move the engines forward. They are way ahead of the wing.

Because the engines are forward, under high acceleration the nose goes up which will cause a stall.

Ldn

This, they basically have a design flaw that they tried to computer program out as the billions of dollars spent on the new 737 design over the past decade that they couldn't just throw away and start from scratch again. Surprised that the flaw was not caught way earlier in the design process and suspect that this was known many, many years ago but nobody wanted to scrap the work that they had done up until that time so it just kept going and going.
 
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This, they basically have a design flaw that they tried to computer program out as the billions of dollars spent on the new 737 design over the past decade that they couldn't just throw away and start from scratch again. Surprised that the flaw was not caught way earlier in the design process and suspect that this was known many, many years ago but nobody wanted to scrap the work that they had done up until that time so it just kept going and going.

Not so sure it was a flaw.
To meet efficiency they needed a taller engine
To put a taller engine on they needed to move it forward
This meant acceleration caused nose to go up.

No problem, we can software that out. And factually they can in these extreme situations.

The flaw was they did not expect 1. The system to rely on a faulty sensor and 2. pilots to not know what was going on and turn it off.

Software flies the plane. So expecting software to work isnt a surprise. The sensor and change to manual not happening that is the surprise.

That said... both crashes were in other countries. We had a guy here in the US deliberately messing with a pitot tube. Could have been sabotage

LdN
 
The engineers wrongly thought pilots would be correctly trained to fly a well-maintained plane with a basic version of MCAS. They were wrong.

Version 2 of MCAS dumbs things down.
 
In order to save airlines millions of dollars in training costs MCAS was a solution that was to make the 737 MAX feel like the earlier versions of the 737. Thus a pilot certified flying a 737-800 could, without new certification, fly the 737 MAX. As mentioned the MCAS was needed because the new fuel efficient engines were forward and up on the wing, thus changing the flight characteristics for pilots who were certified to fly earlier 737 versions. MCAS was supposed to run completely unnoticed in the background.
 
Insufficient pilot training and poor aircraft maintenance is what exposed the MCAS limitations to begin with.
They didn't need to be trained - that is why there was MCAS. As far as poor maintenance both were brand new aircraft. Perhaps bad equipment, or improperly installed equipment, but not poor maintenance.
 
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Insufficient pilot training and poor aircraft maintenance is what exposed the MCAS limitations to begin with.
But, MCAS was changed from it's original design and that is where the problems began leading to two aircraft falling out of the sky shortly after takeoff. There was no training for the updated MCAS and there should have been. It's a really big problem for Boeing.
 
The MCAS system was originally intended to read input from two sensors, but in its final version it was programmed to read only one sensor. When that one sensor failed the pilots, who had no idea the MCAS system existed, lost control of the planes.

https://www.seattletimes.com/seattl...-max-system-gained-power-and-lost-safeguards/




AOA-sensor-works-W.jpg
 
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i guarantee that there were risk meetings held where this 'flaw' was discussed and eventualy somebody in upper management made the decision to ignore it as the cost of not ignoring it was going to be hundreds of millions of dollars. Zero chance that a bunch of Boeing engineers just 'missed' this flaw.
 
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What I don’t understand is why they can’t just disable MCAS and certify the airplane without it.

The 737 has flown for fifty years without that kind of automation so it’s clearly not required for flight, to me anyway.

Because for all intents and purposes, the 737MAX is a different airframe than the 737-800 and it’s predecessors... curioys as to why Boeing chose to retain the 737 naming standard ;)
 
Because for all intents and purposes, the 737MAX is a different airframe than the 737-800 and it’s predecessors... curioys as to why Boeing chose to retain the 737 naming standard ;)
Kinda like Ford calling all of their pickups "F Series" when an F-350 has nothing in common with an F-150 past sheetmetal
 
They didn't need to be trained - that is why there was MCAS. As far as poor maintenance both were brand new aircraft. Perhaps bad equipment, or improperly installed equipment, but not poor maintenance.


EARTH-to-dcf4psu: aircraft require rigorous maintenance, right from the factory wrapper ....

Ethiopian t/n ET-AVJ and Lion Air t/n PK-LQP each had already been through 400+ cycles when they were lost ... these machines were both subject to scheduled maintenance , and likely some that was unscheduled... in fact, Lion Air was deemed non-airworthy the day before after flashing bad speed and altitude data - but was flown the next day anyway... in and of itself, indicative of bad (or no?) maintenance ...

As far as training - many pilots were not even aware of MCAS... as such, one would think they’d need to understand it... much like I want to know how to switch off my cars stability control and other nanny electronics in certain scenarios
 
i guarantee that there were risk meetings held where this 'flaw' was discussed and eventualy somebody in upper management made the decision to ignore it as the cost of not ignoring it was going to be hundreds of millions of dollars. Zero chance that a bunch of Boeing engineers just 'missed' this flaw.
Yeah, that always turns out to be the case.
 
David Calhoun is the new CEO ..... hmmm.

He may have been a Boeing Board member for awhile, but he's not an engineer nor one who at his core is an aviation guy. He's an investment banker and private equity guy.

Doesn't seem like the guy who will lead to cultural change there.
 
Because for all intents and purposes, the 737MAX is a different airframe than the 737-800 and it’s predecessors... curioys as to why Boeing chose to retain the 737 naming standard ;)
Good explanation, yours along with others. I didn’t know the airframe was changed so much.
 
This was long overdue. A terrible amount of damage done to the company starting with the deaths of all those Boeing MAX passengers in those two crashes.
0
40 million dollar golden parachute. Gonna be tough sledding.
 
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Kinda like Ford calling all of their pickups "F Series" when an F-350 has nothing in common with an F-150 past sheetmetal
F stands for Ford. The number denotes weight capacity. 150, 1500 pounds, 250 2500 pounds. Of course the bigger trucks are built on a stronger platform.
 
i guarantee that there were risk meetings held where this 'flaw' was discussed and eventualy somebody in upper management made the decision to ignore it as the cost of not ignoring it was going to be hundreds of millions of dollars. Zero chance that a bunch of Boeing engineers just 'missed' this flaw.
Yep, and that was the result of Boeing migrating to the new age model of letting the financial types be the ultimate decision makers. Didn't work so well for Boeing. I think it was New York Magazine that had an interesting article on this subject.
 
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F stands for Ford. The number denotes weight capacity. 150, 1500 pounds, 250 2500 pounds. Of course the bigger trucks are built on a stronger platform.
I know all that- but that's not why they call them "F Series"
 
Yep, and that was the result of Boeing migrating to the new age model of letting the financial types be the ultimate decision makers. Didn't work so well for Boeing. I think it was New York Magazine that had an interesting article on this subject.

Financial types damn near ruined GM (maybe they did). They for sure destroyed the steel industry in the '70's by not upgrading mils to compete with postwar Europe and Japan. I've always maintained that there are three phases to a corporation:
 
The MCAS system was originally intended to read input from two sensors, but in its final version it was programmed to read only one sensor. When that one sensor failed the pilots, who had no idea the MCAS system existed, lost control of the planes.

https://www.seattletimes.com/seattl...-max-system-gained-power-and-lost-safeguards/




AOA-sensor-works-W.jpg
Pretty amazing they rely on a single sensor. The safety mantra for decades has been redundancy, redundancy, redundancy. Always, but always, have a backup system
 
F stands for Ford. The number denotes weight capacity. 150, 1500 pounds, 250 2500 pounds. Of course the bigger trucks are built on a stronger platform.




Those payload-to-model designations have not existed for ages

2019 F150’s can be spec’d anywhere from 1,200 - 2,300 lb based on what boxes one checks
F-250 spec has payload > 4,200 lbs
F-350 specs out btw 4,300 all the way up to 7,600 lbs

...Nothing like sharing information that is just plain wrong
 
Those payload-to-model designations have not existed for ages

2019 F150’s can be spec’d anywhere from 1,200 - 2,300 lb based on what boxes one checks
F-250 spec has payload > 4,200 lbs
F-350 specs out btw 4,300 all the way up to 7,600 lbs

...Nothing like sharing information that is just plain wrong
I'm well aware what the gross weight limits are. I have owned F Series trucks for many years. My statement was what the numbers stood for. Never said they were the gross weight loads.
 
I'm well aware what the gross weight limits are. I have owned F Series trucks for many years. My statement was what the numbers stood for. Never said they were the gross weight loads.

Those are payload numbers, not GVWR

You may have owned one for many years, but that doesn’t mean you read your owner’s manual
 
Those are payload numbers, not GVWR

You may have owned one for many years, but that doesn’t mean you read your owner’s manual
Good grief. I know exactly what the truck weighs and exact how much weight i can load on it because it's on the tag on the door jamb. That's provided i have the proper license.
 
New Boeing 737 MAX documents show 'very disturbing' employee concerns: U.S. House aide

WASHINGTON (Reuters) - Boeing Co documents under review by a U.S. congressional panel appear to point to a "very disturbing" picture of commentary from the planemaker's employees over the grounded 737 MAX aircraft, a congressional aide said on Tuesday.

The documents were submitted to the House of Representatives transportation infrastructure committee and the Federal Aviation Administration on Monday, the same day Boeing announced the firing of chief executive Dennis Muilenburg amid a crisis over the handling of the aftermath of two fatal crashes.

The best-selling 737 MAX has been grounded since March. The crashes in Indonesia and Ethiopia within five months killed 346 people.

"Similar to other records previously disclosed by Boeing, the records appear to point to a very disturbing picture of both concerns expressed by Boeing employees about the company’s commitment to safety and efforts by some employees" to make sure Boeing’s production plans were not disrupted, said the aide, who spoke on condition of anonymity.

Boeing said in a statement that it "proactively brought these communications to the FAA and Congress as part of our commitment to transparency with our regulators and the oversight committees."

The tone and content "does not reflect the company we are and need to be," Boeing said.

"We have made significant changes as a company in the past nine months to enhance our safety processes, organizations, and culture."

The company said on Monday that Boeing board chairman David Calhoun, 62, a former General Electric executive who has been on the board since 2009 would take over from Muilenburg as CEO and president from Jan. 13.

The latest batch of documents submitted to the FAA contained instant messages from a former Boeing senior pilot, Mark Forkner, according to a person briefed on the matter.

In October, Boeing turned over 2016 messages to the FAA between Forkner and another pilot that said he might have unintentionally misled the U.S. regulator and raised questions about the performance of a key safety system during testing.

Boeing had earlier turned over the documents to the Justice Department, which has an active criminal investigation underway into matters related to the 737 MAX plane.

Boeing is struggling to mend relations with U.S. and international regulators it needs to win over to get the jet back in the air.

Boeing shares, which have dropped more than 20% over the past nine months, closed down 1.3% to $333 on Tuesday.

https://www.yahoo.com/finance/news/...t-175624265.html?_guc_consent_skip=1577232329
 
Good grief. I know exactly what the truck weighs and exact how much weight i can load on it because it's on the tag on the door jamb. That's provided i have the proper license.

Just as long as you don’t go by your theory that F-150 = 1,500# / F-250 = 2,500# etc ;)

I am just glad you don’t drive a Pontiac J2000 :p
 
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